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PROCEDURAL RULES 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 58 A(d) 3,4,5,7 
Summary of Reply Arguments 
Montague's brief is nothing more than a flood of 
computer generated words, irrelevant cases, and spurious 
interpretations iterated to confuse the court and drown in 
the resulting flood the applicable fundamental principles of 
the rule of law clearly iterated in Sew Easy's brief. 
Montague does not deny that he obtained the original 
default under the express false pre-text that Sew Easy had 
been served with process and failed to appear and thus 
subverted Sew Easy's right to notice and hearing before the 
court on the issues related to default. There is no denial 
by Montague that the judge's failure to rule on motions 
stifled prosecution; the judge was biased; the whole case, 
including the counter-claim, should have been dismissed 
under the scope of the court's notice, not just the 
complaint dismissed; that the judge exceeded the notice by 
converting the dismissal hearing into a default judgment 
entry hearing without further notice; that the judge should 
have ruled on objections and held an evidentiary hearing 
before entering any default judgment in this tort counter-
claim and that a timely appeal was filed within thirty days 
from plaintiff's first receipt of actual or constructive 
notice of judgment entry. 
Montague has no valid answer to Sew Easy's arguments 
and law that every one of these procedural facts 
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independently constitutes separate grounds for setting aside 
the spurious counter-claim default judgment. 
The statutes, rules and cases cited by Montague are 
frequently irrelevant to these conceded facts and are 
inapposite to his conclusions when applied to these facts. 
Most of the arguments give credibility to Sew Easy's expose' 
of the spurious Cache County interpretive doctrine which 
elevates self-serving official convenience over private 
rights in interpreting rules and statutes. 
REPLY TO POINT I 
MONTAGUE'S CLAIM TO UNTIMELY APPEAL RESULTS FROM 
GROSS MISCONSTRUCTION AND MISAPPLICATION OF RULE 52 
A(d) U.R.C.P. 
Defendant admits in his brief the relevant facts 
related to the entry of the October 26, 1988 counter-claim 
default judgment and the lack of either actual or 
constructive notice to plaintiff until the March 8, 1989 
actual notice which clearly leads to the legal conclusion 
that the notice of appeal filed on April 5, 1989 was timely. 
(Montague's Brief pgs. 10 & 11). 
Montague admits he never gave the notice of judgment 
entry required by Rule 58 A(d) U.R.C.P. Because plaintiff 
first received actual or constructive notice on March 8, 
1989 (R. 94) of the entry on October 26, 1988 of the 
counter-claim default judgment (R. 73-75), the notice of 
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appeal filed on April 5, 1989 (R. 94) was timely under due 
process, the Utah case law and Rule 58 A(d) U.R.C.P. 
The manifest error in Montague's basic conclusions of 
untimely appeal arise from a misinterpretation and 
misapplication to this case of U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A(d) which 
reads as follows: 
"(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party should promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with 
the clerk of the court. However, the time for 
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the 
notice requirement of this provision. 
Montague admits that he never gave this notice of entry 
and has acknowledged his own surprise at discovering its 
entry in February of 1989. The key to the resolution of the 
issue lies in an underlying due process requirement that a 
right of appeal from a default judgment against one 
(especially when he has appeared in the action) cannot run 
and expire until the party has received actual or 
constructive notice of the event either one of which starts 
the clock running on his right of appeal. Critical to Rule 
58 A(d) interpretation and application here is that the last 
sentence was added by a 1986 amendment to the first sentence 
according to the amendment note. No reported cases since 
1986 aid in the amendment's interpretation. 
The evolution of Rule 58 U.R.C.P. and the way it inter-
relates to all other rules and cases is complex as to when, 
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under particular circumstances, the time clock starts 
running on appeal rights in light of due process notice and 
constructive notice requirements. In light of the due 
process notice requirement, the only valid interpretation of 
the last sentence of Rule 58 A(d) is precisely that the 
appeal time clock will start running no later than the date 
of giving of the specific notice in the specific form 
prescribed in the first sentence of the rule. The later 
added last sentence simply articulates the pre-existing 
state of the rules and case law that fixes the varying 
circumstances construed which fix an earlier date at which 
the appeal time clock starts running because of earlier 
actual or constructive due process conforming notice of 
judgment entry, given in some other manner than that 
provided in Rule 58 A(d) first sentence, 
Montague concedes that he never gave the specific 
notice prescribed in U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A(d) first sentence. 
(Montague Brief paragraph 17 pg. 11.) No appeal time clock 
started running under that specific rule. Sew Easy's 
counsel's affidavit in the record acknowledges actual 
discovery on March 8, 1989 by examining the record (R. 76). 
The appeal notice was filed on April 4, 1989 well within the 
30 day limit from the date of actual notice. The only 
remaining possibility for defeating appellate jurisdiction 
under due process requirements would be if in conformity 
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with due process as it sifts out under the Utah statutes, 
rules and case law, there was constructive notice of entry 
given to Sew Easy prior to 30 days before the notice of 
appeal was filed on April 5, 1989. The record clearly 
reflects an outrageous case of multiple violations of the 
rules by Montague's counsel and the judge that were 
apparently calculated to avoid Sew Easy's receiving either 
actual or constructive notification, 
Montague's interpretation of the second sentence of 
U.R.C.P. Rule 58 A(d) would totally vitiate and nullify any 
substantive meaning to the first sentence in the paragraph 
which was there before the second was added and would 
directly affront the simplest and most basic notice 
requirements under due process. 
The following applicable Utah cases when applied here 
hold that Sew Easy received no due process conforming actual 
or constructive notice of the entry of the default judgment 
before March 8, 1989. This conclusion is particularly valid 
when viewed in the light that the judge never ruled on the 
timely objections to the default order and judgment 
proposal. If Sew Easy had examined the record every day 
from the time of receipt of the proposal on September 27, 
1988 until the judge signed and entered the same on October 
26, 1989 there would have appeared neither a ruling on 
objections nor the signed and entered default judgment. The 
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judge also had a history in this case of never ruling on 
(the discovery) motions. See R. 41 to 50 and Montague Brief 
pg. 10, top. 
There are other facts in the record that would negate 
constructive notice in this case under the following 
precedents: Marsh v. Utah Homes, Inc., 408 P.2d. 906; 
Bish's Metal Company v. Luras, 359 P.2d. 21. Plaintiff 
filed a timely objection to entry of the proposed judgment 
which was never ruled on and which the judge totally ignored 
in later entry of the proposal objected to. The judge had a 
very long history in this case of never ruling on pending 
motions which were at issue (Montague Brief pg. 10). 
REPLY TO POINTS II AND IV 
MONTAGUE'S ARGUMENTS THAT SEW EASY SOMEHOW WAIVED 
BY SILENCE AN UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND OTHER DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IS 
ABSURD AND CONTRADICTORY. 
Montague cites totally irrelevant cases rather than 
answering or distinguishing Sew Easy's cited cases holding 
that an unliquidated damage default evidentiary hearing is a 
jurisdictional requirement. Montague's cited cases address 
irrelevant, non-jurisdictional new issues raised after full 
trial and on appeal for the first time. They include 
default cases on liquidated damage claims where the trial 
court has some discretion. This clearly smacks of an 
evasive admission tantamount to a confession of error in 
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entry of the default judgment. See Sew Easy brief Point II 
pages 15 and 16 and Montague's brief Point II pages 17 to 20 
and Point IV pages 21 and 22. 
Montague's Point IV attempts to skirt the reality that 
this court has clearly applied objective constitutional 
judicial interpretive standards to U.R.C.P. Rule 55 (b)(1) 
and (2) and concluded as the law of this state that when a 
default judgment is for a sum which is uncertain as in this 
case, an evidentiary damage hearing is absolutely required 
even though the rule says "may". Failure to do so in this 
unliquidated damage case was a clear abuse of discretion and 
denial of due process as a matter of the law of the Utah 
cases cited on pages 16 and 20 of the Sew Easy brief. 
REPLY TO POINT III 
THE REPEATED ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ACTIONS OF 
THE JUDGE EVINCE THE TAINTED FRUITS OF ACTUAL BIAS 
ARISING FROM THE CITED INCIDENTS OF CONFLICTS. 
Montague's argument on page 21 of his brief that 
there is "not one shred of evidence" of judicial bias or 
prejudice is false. The multiple direct conflicts of 
interest are conclusively established. The fact that the 
judge, while so burdened, denied due process to Sew Easy on 
at least four occasions shows that he was implementing his 
malice. In the cases cited by Defendant, there was no such 
direct evidence of the conflict and certainly none showing 
any or repeated acts of due process denial. 
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REPLY TO POINT V 
MONTAGUE EVADES THE ISSUE THAT THE SPURIOUS DEFAULT 
WAS ENTERED BY A CLERK UNDER FALSE PRETENSES AND 
WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING AS REQUIRED. 
Montague falsely implies that the default was entered 
by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion after 
notice and hearing on pages 23 and 24 of his brief. Under 
the rules and due process, the court has no discretion to 
take any action against a party who has appeared as Sew Easy 
did in this case and, most certainly the clerk has no such 
discretionary powers in this regard as was done here. 
Montague obtained the default from the clerk by false 
representations that Sew Easy was served with process and 
had not appeared, and thus obtained the absurd extra-legal 
default. 
Montague's whole argument in Point V under the rules 
and due process should have been part of an initial motion 
and memorandum for entry of a default properly served on Sew 
Easy. Then Sew Easy's brief arguments on page 2 3 of its 
brief would have been in an opposition memorandum and due 
process would have been satisfied on the initial default 
matter. Even if arguendo, in spite of Wells v. Wells, 272 
P.2d. 167 (Utah 1954), the court would have reguired a reply 
other than the complaint as necessary after notice and 
hearing, it would have clearly been an abuse of discretion 
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to have disallowed the filing of a (repetitive) reply and 
entered a default judgment at that point* 
Montague's argument Point VI, pages 25 and 2 6 again 
fail to answer Sew Easy's point that the judge's dismissal 
had to dismiss the whole suit or none of it. The notice 
said it that way, the suit would be dismissed and the 
principle of inherent power also requires that the whole 
suit be dismissed to clear it from the calendar under the 
cases cited in both briefs. It is undeniable that the 
complaint and counter-claim are both part of that same suit 
and should have both been dismissed or neither of the claims 
should have been dismissed. The arbitrary prejudicial 
bifurcation without even litigating the issues raised by the 
complaint as a reply to the counter-claim is further 
evidence of actual bias. 
REPLY TO POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
THE COMPLAINT PART OF THE SUIT AND THEN GIVING 
DEFAULT ON THE COUNTER-CLAIM PART. 
REPLY TO POINT VII 
THE UNLIQUIDATED DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTRY IS VOID ON 
MULTIPLE GROUNDS. 
The defendant compulsively misapplies cases setting 
standards for setting aside non-default judgments where 
there have been trials on the merits with the apparent 
objective of confusing the court. Montague has effectively 
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admitted by failure to answer, that it ife the law of this 
court that default judgments are not favored, are not in the 
interests of fair play and that what is favored is a full 
and complete opportunity for hearing on the merits of every 
case. See Sew Easy brief page 21. 
Montague's arguments regarding due process in general 
are not applicable and constitute a default in answering Sew 
Easy's specific arguments in Point III of its brief. .PA 
CONCLUSION 
Montague totally failed in answering Sew Easy's 
arguments and this court should set aside the spurious 
default judgment obtained by multiple denials of due process 
Min the interest of justice and fair play" and thus allow a 
resolution on the merits of the complaint and counter-claim. 
Signed this _JJ^~day o&^ctolper, 1989. 
David R. Daines ' 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
DM-SC11 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four exact copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid in 
Logan, Utah to Brad H. Bearnson, 56 West Center, P. 0. Box 
525, Logan, Utah 84321, this 7ft^day of October, 1989. 
David R. Daines 
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